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INTRODUCTION 
As the income gap between the rich and the poor widens, 
Americans have begun to demand reform.1  The Occupy Wall Street 
                                                                                                                 
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham Law School, 2013.  I would especially like to thank 
Professor Linda Sugin for her guidance in developing this topic, reviewing multiple 
drafts of this Note, and providing thoughtful comments.  I am also very grateful to the 
members of the Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law for their hard work in 
preparing this Note for publication. 
 1. See Jose Fernando Lopez, Income Distribution and the Occupy Wall Street 
Movement, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 8, 2011, 7:32 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jose-fernando-lopez/cbo-munitions-to-occupy-
w_b_1080729.html. 
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movement is a recent reflection of the public’s frustration.2  The 
lowering of the effective tax rate for the very rich to 18% in 2008 from 
30% in 1995 is often cited as the main cause for the income gap.3  Tax 
experts, however, are aware that the drop in effective tax rates for the 
very rich over the years is only the tip of the iceberg; a much larger 
problem looms in the non-taxation of unrealized gains.4  Although the 
very rich generate a majority of their income from the appreciation of 
their assets like stocks, business interest, and real estate,5 the 
appreciation of that property can only be taxed when realized under the 
current law.6  Mark Zuckerberg, a co-founder and chief executive officer 
of the popular social networking service Facebook, is an example of this 
phenomenon.7  Some analysts estimated Mr. Zuckerberg’s stake in 
Facebook to be worth as much as $28 billion before the IPO of the 
company.8  Mr. Zuckerberg will not be taxed on his stake in Facebook 
unless he disposes of his shares.9  If upon death, Mr. Zuckerberg 
bequeaths the shares to his heirs, his heirs will only pay tax upon sale of 
the stock only for the appreciation in value since Mr. Zuckerberg’s 
death.10 
Some call the realization rule “‘the Achilles’ heel’ of the tax 
system, ‘the root of many tax evils,’ and . . . ‘the most intractable 
problem in the income tax.’”11  One explanation for the rule is the belief 
                                                                                                                 
 2. See id. 
 3. Ultrarich Are Aware of Tax Loophole on Unrealized Gains, INVESTMENTNEWS 
(Dec. 4, 2011, 6:01 AM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20111204/REG/ 
312049976. 
 4. See id. (“The 800-pound gorilla is unrealized appreciation.” (quoting Edward J. 
McCaffery)). 
 5. Arthur B. Kennickell, Ponds and Streams: Wealth and Income in the U.S., 
1989 to 2007, 25–26 (Fed. Reserve Bd., Working Paper No. 2009-13, 2009), available 
at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200913/200913pap.pdf. 
 6. See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 212 (1920). 
 7. See David S. Miller, Op-Ed, The Zuckerberg Tax, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2012, at 
A27, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/08/opinion/the-zuckerberg-
tax.html. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. David M. Schizer, Realization as Subsidy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1549, 1551 
(1998) (citing William D. Andrews, The Achilles’ Heel of the Comprehensive Income 
Tax, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN FEDERAL TAX POLICY FOR THE 1980S, at 278, 280 (Charls 
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that unrealized gains cannot be employed for “separate use and benefit” 
unless realized,12 but the reality is that there are ways for the wealthy to 
generate cash for consumption, completely tax-free, without ever 
needing to dispose of their assets.13  For example, Mr. Zuckerberg can 
simply use his stocks as collateral to borrow against, thereby avoiding 
tax liability while enjoying the fruits of his enormous unrealized 
wealth.14  This scenario is even more likely today, when the interest 
rates for the very rich have plummeted to almost 1%.15  Mark 
Zuckerberg’s ability to avoid taxes on his enormous wealth is only a 
very recent example of how the very rich can take advantage of “Tax 
Planning 101.”16 
Thirty-five years after its first publication, William D. Andrews’ 
seemingly radical approach, adopting a consumption-based tax system 
to solve the problem with the realization rule,17 draws renewed interest.  
The proposal provides simple solutions to the efficiency and equity 
problems of the realization rule without creating new complications.18  
Unlike other proposals, Andrews’ forgotten approach to solving the 
realization rule puzzle is simple and creates few undesirable 
consequences.19  Part I of this Note explores the historical and legal 
framework of the realization rule and its relation to income.  In addition, 
Part I discusses the equity and efficiency problems of the realization rule 
and provides legal background for Andrews’ proposal.  Part II of this 
Note examines the numerous proposals that have emerged since the 
adoption of the realization rule.  Moreover, Part II uses classic tax policy 
                                                                                                                 
E. Walker & Mark A. Bloomfield eds., 1983); Edward D. Kleinbard & Thomas L. 
Evans, The Role of Mark-to-Market Accounting in a Realization-Based Tax System, 75 
TAXES 788, 789 (1997); Noël B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, Taxation Without 
Realization: A “Revolutionary” Approach to Ownership, 47 TAX L. REV. 725, 728 
(1992)). 
 12. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 211 (1920). 
 13. See Miller, supra note 7. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See Ultrarich Are Aware of Tax Loophole on Unrealized Gains, supra note 3. 
 16. See Edward J. McCaffery, A New Understanding of Tax, 103 MICH. L. REV. 
809, 893 (2005) (citing Roger Gordon et al., Do We Now Collect Any Revenue from 
Taxing Capital Income?, 89 J. PUB. ECON. 981 (2004)) (discussing historical examples 
of a wealthy person’s tax planning activities). 
 17. See infra Part III. 
 18. See infra Part III. 
 19. See infra Part III. 
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analysis to explain the equity and efficiency problems of the mark-to-
market, interest-on-tax, and retrospective taxation proposals.  Part III of 
this Note explores Andrews’ proposal in detail and explains why 
Andrews’ consumption tax system effectively solves the realization rule 
problem.  Part III also addresses critics’ concerns of the consumption tax 
system. 
I.  A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE REALIZATION RULE PROBLEM 
AND ITS RELATION TO INCOME 
Section A of Part I takes a historical look at how the realization rule 
became part of the definition of income.  Then, Section B explores the 
equity and efficiency problems that the realization rule creates.  Section 
C examines several of the remedial proposals that have emerged in 
response to the realization rule.  Finally, Section D provides historical 
background for Andrews’ consumption tax proposal and explains why 
Andrews’ proposal becomes relevant today. 
A. THE MEANING OF INCOME 
There is no universal agreement on the meaning of income.20  
Economists generally view income differently from governmental 
entities, and economists and experts within government disagree among 
themselves.21  The result is an income tax base that is a hybrid of 
economic, political, and legal concepts.22  Economists understand 
income as the periodic sum of consumption and changes in savings and 
investments, which follows the Haig-Simons conception of income.23  
While the United States Constitution gives Congress the power to “[t]o 
lay and collect taxes,” it does not define income.24  The Sixteenth 
Amendment of the Constitution provides that “Congress shall have the 
                                                                                                                 
 20. See HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50–51 (1938); Eisner v. 
Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920). 
 21. Marjorie M. Kornhauser, The Story of Macomber: The Continuing Legacy of 
Realization, in TAX STORIES, 93, 95 (Paul L. Caron ed., 2003). 
 22. Boris I. Bittker, A “Comprehensive Tax Base” as a Goal of Income Tax 
Reform, 80 HARV. L. REV. 925, 930–32 (1967). 
 23. See SIMONS, supra note 20, at 50. 
 24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
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power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, form whatever sources 
derived.”25  The Tax Code echoes the Sixteenth Amendment, defining 
income as “all income from whatever source derived” and provides a 
non-exclusive list of 15 sources of income.26  Section 61 of the Internal 
Revenue Code further defines gross income.27 
In Eisner v. Macomber,28 the Supreme Court limited taxable 
income to income realized and explained that income is neither a gain 
accruing to capital, nor a growth or increment of value in the 
investment.29  Rather, the Court concluded that income could only 
consist of funds received or drawn by the taxpayers for his use, benefit, 
and disposal.30  The Macomber Court not only redefined taxable income 
but it also made the realization rule a constitutional requirement.31 
After Macomber, the Supreme Court tried to loosen the realization 
requirement by defining which events constitute realization.32  The most 
significant departure from Macomber was the decision in Helvering v. 
Bruun.33  In Bruun, the Court held that “separation from capital” was not 
an all-inclusive definition of realization.34  Ten days later, the Court 
went on to explain in Helvering v. Horst35 that realization was a rule 
“founded on administrative convenience” and meant only to delay 
taxation.36  The Court, however, never fully overruled Macomber’s 
institution of realization as a constitutional requirement.37 
Despite the Court’s unwillingness to obviate the realization rule as 
a constitutional requirement, Congress has enacted several statutes that 
abandon this rule.  Section 1256 of the Code treats certain contracts on a 
mark-to-market basis partially in order to avoid the long-standing 
                                                                                                                 
 25. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
 26. I.R.C. § 61(a) (2006). 
 27. Id. 
 28. 252 U.S. 189 (1920). 
 29. Id. at 193. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See id. 
 32. See, e.g, United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156 (1921). 
 33. 309 U.S. 461 (1940). 
 34. Id. at 468–69. 
 35. 311 U.S. 112 (1940). 
 36. Id. at 116. 
 37. Rodney P. Mock & Jeffrey Tolin, Realization and its Evil Twin Deemed 
Realization, 31 VA. TAX REV. 573, 592 (2012). 
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problem of straddles.38  A straddle is a contract for futures or options 
where one position is long and the other is short, and the gain in one 
position is offset by loss in the other.39  Until the adoption of § 1256, it 
was possible to declare the losing position in one year and the gain in 
the next year.40  This would generate a deduction against other income 
in the first year and that loss would be carried forward to the next year.41  
Section 1256 requires that both sides of the transaction be reported on a 
mark-to-market basis at year-end.42  In addition, Congress has enacted § 
475, which requires dealers in securities to report their shares on a fair 
market basis at the last business day of the year.43  Furthermore, lessors 
and lessees are required to maintain certain payments for the use of 
property or services on an accrual basis under § 467.44 
B. PROBLEMS POSED BY THE REALIZATION RULE 
If the federal income tax structure is designed to guarantee the 
same rate of tax on all income, then the realization rule violates both 
horizontal and vertical equity.45  Vertical equity is violated because 
under the realization rule, it is wealthy taxpayers who mainly benefit 
from the deferral of tax.46  Similarly, horizontal equity is compromised 
because the same level of income from different sources is taxed 
differently under the current tax system.47 
The realization rule violates vertical equity because the wealthy 
benefit disproportionally from this rule.  Vertical equity demands higher 
income taxpayers to be taxed more heavily than lower income 
                                                                                                                 
 38. I.R.C. § 1256 (2006). 
 39. 57 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, 
ESTATES AND GIFTS:CURRENT THROUGH 2012, at 1 (2012). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 147, 334 (7th ed. 2005). 
 43. I.R.C. § 475 (2006). 
 44. I.R.C. § 467 (2006). 
 45. See Deborah H. Schenk, A Positive Account of the Realization Rule, 57 TAX L. 
REV. 355, 392 (2004) (citing Eric M. Zolt, The Uneasy Case for Uniform Taxation, 16 
VA. TAX. REV. 39, 42 (1996) (noting that if efficiency were the only concern, different 
rates on labor and capital income might be preferable). 
 46. See Kennickell, supra note 5. 
 47. See Schenk, supra note 45, at 393. 
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taxpayers.48  Unrealized capital gains represent a larger portion of the 
income of the wealthy because they can afford to hold large amounts of 
capital.49  In addition, capital needs to be held for a long period of time 
in order for its holder to benefit from the tax deferral, again something 
that wealthy taxpayers are able to afford.50  Moreover, taking full 
advantage of the realization rule requires careful tax planning that is 
typically used by the wealthy.51  Finally, because wealthy taxpayers can 
borrow against their unrealized gain to support their lifestyle and later 
pass the gain to their heirs, they are able to avoid tax altogether.52  To 
the extent that wealthy taxpayers benefit disproportionally from the tax 
deferral, vertical equity is violated. 
Horizontal equity requires that the tax system treat similarly 
situated individuals the same.53  Similarly situated individuals for tax 
purposes are those individuals who have the same levels of income 
regardless of the source.54  Under the current tax system, however, 
income from different sources is treated differently.55  Moreover, 
accrued gains are taxed on a stepped up basis when appreciated property 
is transferred to charity or held until death.56  Inequities would result 
only if the tax savings are not fully capitalized into the price of the 
asset.57  It is unlikely that the tax advantage of an asset is capitalized 
fully into its price for many reasons, including different marginal and 
effective rates, difficult entry barriers to the market, loss limitations, and 
                                                                                                                 
 48. HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 15, 148, 334 (7th ed. 2005). 
 49. See Schenk, supra note 45, at 393. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Edward J. McCaffery, The Uneasy Case for Capital Taxation, 23 SOC. PHIL. & 
POL’Y 166, 175 (2006), available at http://journals.cambridge.org/action/ 
displayFulltext?type=1&fid=439801&jid=SOY&volumeId=23&issueId=02&aid=4398
00&bodyId=&membershipNumber=&societyETOCSession=#. 
 53. Richard J. Wood, Supreme Court Jurisprudence of Tax Fairness, 36 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 421, 422 (2006). 
 54. See Jeffrey L. Kwall, When Should Asset Appreciation be Taxed?: The Case 
for a Disposition Standard of Realization, 86 IND. L.J. 77, 92 (2011) (citing RICHARD 
A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE: A STUDY IN PUBLIC ECONOMY 160 
(1959)). 
 55. See, e.g., Desco Prods. Caribbean, Inc. v. ’Virgin Islands, 511 F.2d 1157 (3d 
Cir. 1975) (applying Virgin Islands law); Miles v. Dep’t of Treasury, 199 N.E. 372 
(Ind. 1935); Welch v. Henry, 223 Wis. 319 (1937). 
 56. See I.R.C. § 1014(a) (2006). 
 57. Schenk, supra note 45, at 394. 
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taxpayers who do not change their investment behavior based on tax 
advantages.58  Therefore, it seems unlikely that the tax benefits of the 
realization rule are fully capitalized into the price of the assets and 
certain sources of income are taxed at preferential effective tax rates.59 
The realization rule in its pure form results in multiple 
inefficiencies.60  Further distortions are caused by government’s efforts 
to correct for some of the inefficiencies.61  These inefficiencies can be 
roughly divided into distortions in taxpayers’ behavior and inefficiencies 
caused by the transactional cost to both the taxpayers and the 
government associated with avoiding or administering the rule.62  
Moreover, the realization rule causes serious revenue effects.63 
1. Lock-in Effect and Loss Limitations 
The realization rule creates a lock-in effect that discourages many 
taxpayers from making divestment decisions purely based on whether it 
would make sense to do so.64  This has been cited as a partial reason for 
the lower rates on capital gains.65  However, while the alternative of 
simply borrowing against unrealized gains and paying no income tax 
exists, the lock-in effect will not be fully neutralized with lower rates on 
capital gains because the interest charges for the very rich are only a 
fraction of the reduced tax rate on capital gains.66  The amnesty given to 
unrealized capital gains at death allows many taxpayers to borrow 
against their realized and unrealized assets, and never pay tax.67  This is 
because the Code allows taxpayers to bequest assets to their heirs at a 
                                                                                                                 
 58. Id. at 394–96. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Daniel N. Shaviro, An Efficiency Analysis of Realization and Recognition Rules 
Under the Federal Income Tax, 48 TAX L. REV. 1, 25 (1993). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 24. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Stephen B. Land, Defeating Deferral: A Proposal for Retrospective Taxation, 
52 TAX L. REV. 45, 50 (1998). 
 65. See Noël B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, The Case for a Capital Gains 
Preference, 48 TAX L. REV. 319, 344 (1993) (“The lock-in effect describes an 
investor’s reluctance to incur a tax on realization of gains . . . .”). 
 66. McCaffery, supra note 16, at 896. 
 67. McCaffery, supra note 16, at 892–93. 
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step-up basis.68  As a result, the capital gain that had accumulated until 
that moment is never taxed.69  A consequence of this treatment is an 
exaggerated lock-in effect.70 
2. Transactional Costs 
Another source of inefficiency is the transaction costs associated 
with using the realization rule to one’s economic advantage.71  These 
costs include information costs and fees paid to lawyers or accountants 
to provide information about the law and various tax planning 
strategies.72  The complexity of the realization rule drives information 
costs even higher,73 as well asthe complexity of legislative responses 
that seek to limit the abuse of the realization rule.74  Such responses 
include loss limitation rules to deter strategic trading or expense 
allocation, as well as provisions designed to recover some of the benefits 
of deferral.75 Lastly, the capital gains preference adds another wrinkle of 
complexity.76 
In order to limit the scope and abuses of the realization rule, 
Congress must constantly adopt new provisions.77  Legislation is a 
continuous and costly battle because often, limiting one abuse simply 
shifts taxpayers’ behavior to a new scheme.78  For example, Congress 
adopted § 1259 to limit an investor’s ability to benefit from economic 
gain while deferring their tax obligation;79 however, § 1259 did not 
                                                                                                                 
 68. I.R.C. § 1014 (2006); Calvin H. Johnson, Taxing the Consumption of Capital 
Gains, 28 VA. TAX. REV. 477, 502 (2009). 
 69. Johnson, supra note 68, at 502. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Schenk, supra note 45, at 391. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 392. 
 77. See id. at 388 (citing I.R.C. § 1211 (2006) (limitations on capital losses); I.R.C. 
§ 1091 (2006) (losses on wash sales); I.R.C. § 1092 (2006) (straddle rules); I.R.C. § 267 
(2006) (losses on sales to related parties) I.R.C. § 163(d) (2006) (limitations on interest 
deductions); I.R.C. § 469 (2006) (passive loss rules)). 
 78. Schenk, supra note 45, at 392. 
 79. Id. at 388. 
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foreclose all opportunities to defer gain.80  As a result, taxpayers have 
replaced a short-against-the-box transaction strategy—a short sale by 
a individual with a long position in the same securities—with one 
where the investor retains 25% of the risk.81  Overall, the realization rule 
causes taxpayers and the government to incur substantial transaction 
costs.82  Most of these transaction costs do not raise revenue.83  It is 
unlikely that any tax reform will entirely eliminate transactional costs 
but such costs should be a main consideration in evaluating reform 
proposals.84 
3. Revenue Effect 
Tax deferral under the realization rule, the many ways taxpayers 
are able to decrease their tax bill, and the possibility of complete tax 
avoidance under the buy/borrow/die tax planning strategy, significantly 
affect government’s revenue.85  By deferring tax payments under the 
realize rule, the value of the tax paid will be worth less because of 
inflation.86  In addition, the preferential rates for capital gains lower the 
government’s revenue even further.87   
II. PROPOSALS AIMING TO ADDRESS THE REALIZATION RULE 
PROBLEMS 
Numerous proposals have emerged in an attempt to remedy 
problems that arise under the realization rule.  One such proposal is a 
mark-to-market system where gains and losses are taken into account 
each year whether realized or not.88  Under this regime, on the last day 
of the year, each unsold asset is treated as if it had been sold that day at 
                                                                                                                 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 392. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text. 
 86. Schizer, supra note 11, at 1563. 
 87. See I.R.C. § 1(h) (2006). 
 88. Deborah H. Schenk, An Efficiency Approach to Reforming a Realization-Based 
Tax, 57 TAX L. REV. 503, 541 (2004). 
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a price equal to its fair market value, and then reacquired at the same 
price.89  Other proposals offer to preserve the realization rule but suggest 
ways to eliminate some of the negative consequences of the realization 
rule.90 
The interest-on-tax deferral proposals preserve the realization 
requirement by assuming that the proper time to tax is upon a realization 
event.91  This proposal views the deferred tax as a loan from the 
government where interest should be charged.92  In this way, the 
interest-on-tax deferral proposals attempt to eliminate the deferral 
benefits of the realization rule under the current system and restore 
horizontal and vertical equity.93  Similar to the interest-on-tax deferral 
approach, retrospective proposals also preserve the realization 
requirement while stripping the deferral benefits under the current 
system.94  Retrospective proposals split the ex post return of an asset 
into a return to waiting and return to risk, allocate the returns over the 
holding period, and impose interest on the deferred taxes at the risk-free 
rate.95 
Part II provides a detailed tax policy analysis of the main proposals 
for reforming the realization rule.  Section A analyses a mark-to-market 
system, while Section B evaluates proposals that preserve the realization 
rule but attempt to strip deferral tax benefits.  Specifically, Section B 
looks at interest-on-tax deferral proposals and retrospective taxation 
proposals.  Part C discusses retrospective taxation.  Part D introduces 
Andrews’ proposal for a consumption tax system. 
                                                                                                                 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Cynthia Blum, New Role of the Treasury: Charging Interest on Tax Deferral 
Loans, 25 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (1988); Roger Brinner, Inflation, Deferral and the 
Neutral Taxation of Capital Gains, 26 NAT’L TAX J. 565, 570–71 (1973). 
 92. Schenk, supra note 88, at 541. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See Land, supra note 64, at 83, 107; Alan J. Auerbach, Retrospective Capital 
Gains Taxation, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 167, 167 (1991); David F. Bradford, Fixing 
Realization Accounting: Symmetry, Consistency and Correctness in the Taxation of 
Financial Instruments, 50 Tax L. Rev. 731, 738 (1995). 
 95. Schenk, supra note 88, at 541. 
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A. A MARK-TO-MARKET SYSTEM 
A mark-to-market system presents a perfect world where capital 
gains are taxed on a periodic basis in a manner consistent with the 
taxation of other income, such as wages.96  While this approach will 
solve many of the problems with the realization rule,97 a new subset of 
efficiency and equity concerns emerges.98  This explains why a mark-to-
market system has not been adopted.99 
A mark-to-market system presents serious liquidity concerns.100  A 
system that taxes increases in net worth without regards to liquidity will 
distort taxpayers’ behavior much more than one that taxes at sale when 
cash is available.101  Under a mark-to-market system, tax is due at year-
end regardless of whether the gain is realized and the taxpayer is able to 
pay the tax.102  This will cause forced liquidations, which is especially 
problematic for real estate, closely held businesses, and other non-
divisible assets.103  Some commentators believe that liquidity is not a 
significant concern and is not a sufficient justification for the realization 
rule.104  These commentators point out that Congress currently imposes 
taxes in situations where liquidity is a concern as in swaps of 
properties.105  Taxpayers are also subject to tax when they are 
compensated with property regardless whether they decide to sell the 
property.106  Also, accrual based taxpayers have tax obligations without 
receipt, and any liquidity concerns are simply considered the cost of 
doing business.107 
Nevertheless, these situations are deviations from the norm.  
Currently, taxpayers are generally put on notice when they have to pay 
                                                                                                                 
 96. Fred B. Brown, “Complete” Accrual Taxation, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1559, 
1562 (1996). 
 97. Id. at 1565–66. 
 98. Schenk, supra note 88, at 541. 
 99. Schenk, supra note 45, at 374. 
 100. Land, supra note 64, at 65. 
 101. Id. at 55. 
 102. Id. at 59. 
 103. Id. at 110. 
 104. Schenk, supra note 45, at 360. 
 105. Id. at 361. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
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tax, which helps them factor in the cost of such tax in their decision to 
engage in particular transaction.108  A mark-to-market system would not 
always give taxpayers any forewarning or options to avoid the tax.109  
This can be particularly problematic in situations where assets are not 
easily sold.110  Even more problematic is a situation where the 
taxpayer’s only asset is his home or family farm.111  While liquidity 
problems alone do not justify the realization rule, the liquidity concerns 
in a pure mark-to-market system will require multiple exemptions to be 
carved out in order to minimize the disruptiveness of such system.112 
A second frequently cited problem to a mark-to-market system is 
valuation.113  An accretion tax would require that all assets are valued at 
the end of the year.114  Some believe that the resulting administrative 
burden is almost prohibitive.115  Others see the valuation concern as not 
so easily assessed.116  Those who do not see valuation as a significant 
problem cite to studies showing that the annual inventory of publicly 
traded securities would not be so burdensome.117  These advocates also 
point to the transfer system, real estate annual valuations, and estate 
taxes as examples of valuations that are relatively stable and not as 
problematic.118  Although such valuations are not always accurate, 
proponents of a mark-to-market system say that an approximate 
valuation might be sufficiently acceptable and therefore valuation 
should not be a significant reason to reject the mark-to-market system.119 
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Critics of the mark-to-market system also note that estate taxes and 
property taxes under the current system are different than the scale of 
valuation that will be required under a mark-to-market system.120  While 
estate taxes are imposed on limited wealthy taxpayers, a mark-to-market 
system will apply to a far larger segment of the population.  Even those 
who accept an approximation of estate taxes for the wealthy might be 
unwilling to compromise to inaccurate calculations for those less well-
off.121  Property taxes are also easier to calculate because they typically 
apply only to real estate within a given community and track only 
relative property values, and these values are unlikely to change 
dramatically year to year.122 
Valuation is even more complex for unique items such as jewelry, 
closely held businesses, artwork, etc.123  At least one critic has 
recognized that since everything can be valued, the real issue is how 
much such annual valuations would cost.124  While the taxpayers will 
have to bear the majority of such cost, the government will also have to 
absorb some of the cost of monitoring.125  The taxpayers have little 
incentive to get the valuation right, and, therefore, the government will 
have to spend significant resources to monitor the correct valuation of 
assets.126 
Society’s deep-rooted intuition is that paper-gains are 
“insufficiently authentic to be taxed.”127  That perception is grounded in 
the idea that returns based on market risk are transient and taxpayers 
should not be subject to payment while that market risk continues to 
exist.128  Critics argue that a mark-to-market system assumes that assets 
have value based on their potential to be sold when, in reality, their 
value is only hypothetical without an actual sale.129  Some critics believe 
                                                                                                                 
 120. Land, supra note 64, at 56. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Schenk, supra note 45, at 367. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 367–68. 
 126. Id. at 368. 
 127. Edward A. Zelinsky, For Realization: Income Taxation, Sectoral Accretionism, 
and the Virtue of Attainable Virtues, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 861, 893 (1997). 
 128. Schenk, supra note 45, at 377. 
 129. Land, supra note 64, at 56–57. 
2013] SOLVING THE REALIZATION PROBLEM 503 
 
that no valuation model can assign true value to an asset because value 
is not an intrinsic property of an asset.130  The income tax system 
appears to be socially acceptable because it is based on ability to pay.131  
Ability to pay is related both to net worth and liquidity.132 
B. INTEREST-ON-TAX DEFERRAL PROPOSALS 
“These proposals take the realization requirement as a given but 
assume that the proper time to tax (if it were possible) is when the 
income accrues.”133  Currently, the tax liability is treated as an interest-
free loan from the government.134  The interest-on-tax deferral proposals 
suggest that the government ought to charge a fee for these interest-free 
loans.135  As such, “the investor allocates the gain or loss over the 
holding period of the investment, calculates tax for each year, and 
imputes the interest on the under- or overpayment of taxes;”136 however, 
the proposals are problematic in terms of the correct valuation of the 
interest and even liquidity.137 
The main valuation problem is similar to the problem that is present 
under the mark-to-market system.138  The correct amount of the “loan” 
and interest cannot be calculated without determining what the 
taxpayers would have owed at the end of each year.139  Because such 
calculations would be prohibitively complex, most proposals involve 
simplified interest calculation using the assumption that the gain grew 
ratably or at some compound rate.140  Both methods of calculation are 
likely to either under-tax or over-tax the taxpayer.141  Consider a 
constant rate model, which would result in a larger loan later in the 
period because of the effects of compounding.142  The outcome is an 
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overstatement of the loan in the early period, and thus, an increased 
amount of interest.143  In cases where most of the gain accrued late in the 
holding period, there will be a large interest charge without a matching 
deferral.144  Thus, the tax will be overstated.145  Conversely, if the gain 
accrued immediately after acquisition, the taxpayer will be under-
taxed.146  The potential over-taxation and under-taxation will likely 
cause distortions as taxpayers whose assets surged in value immediately 
after acquisition will try to hold on to assets in order to take advantage 
of the lower tax for deferral and those whose assets suddenly spiked in 
value will look to sell those assets.147 
Another valuation problem is that the use of the sale price might 
not be an accurate measure of the correct amount of tax loan.148  This 
will result in under-taxation.149  Another administrative problem related 
to valuation is fixing the interest rates.150  It is unclear whether the 
taxpayer’s or the government’s borrowing rate should be used.151  Using 
the taxpayer’s rate will be problematic because of the immense 
information gathering that would be required and the inequities that will 
result from taxpayers with poor credit ratings having to pay the highest 
interest charges.152  However, using the government’s borrowing rate is 
also challenging because a rate that is different from the taxpayer’s 
borrowing rate will affect the taxpayer’s borrowing decisions, 
particularly for taxpayers with bad credit.153  Another problem with this 
approach is that the interest rate will have to remain constant which will 
cause further distortions and inaccuracies related to unequal conditions 
at the time of acquisition and time of sale.154 
Interest-on-tax proposals are appealing because they seem to 
restore vertical and horizontal equity without causing the efficiency 
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problems of the accretion system.155  However, because accurate 
calculation of the tax and interest will be extremely complex, simplified 
accounting will result in over and under calculation of the tax.156  This 
will affect horizontal equity, as similar levels of income will be taxed 
differently depending on the length of the loan and the period in which 
the asset increased in value.157 
C. RETROSPECTIVE TAXATION 
Retrospective proposals also preserve the realization requirement 
while shedding the deferral benefits under the current system.158  Alan 
Auerbach first developed such approach, later followed by David 
Bradford and Stephen Land.159  The Auerbach and Bradford proposals 
are conceptually different from Land’s proposal.160  Auerbach and 
Bradford suggest a  division of  the ex post return into a “return to 
waiting” and “return to risk,” followed by an allocation of the returns 
over the holding period, and charging interest at the risk-free rate on the 
deferred taxes.161  Land’s proposal is different in that it does not look at 
the deferred tax as a loan from the government but as an “equity 
investment by the government.”162 
Because the retrospective proposals correct the effects of the 
realization requirement, they promote greater horizontal and vertical 
equity. The retrospective proposals aim to draw no distinction between 
those investors who defer realization and those taxed on their income 
annually by eliminating the effect of the deferrals.163  This approach 
promotes horizontal equity.164  Moreover, since the realization 
requirement mainly favors the wealthy, stripping the deferral benefits of 
the realization rule, advances vertical equity.165 
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A main advantage of the Auerbach/Bradford proposals is that they 
eliminate any incentives to defer the realization of gains, because 
“taxpayers would be in the same position regardless of when disposition 
takes place.”166  Like the interest-to-tax deferral proposals, the 
Auerbach/Bradford proposals remove liquidity issues by preserving the 
realization requirement and eliminate the timing option by levying an 
interest charge.167  Valuation issues are resolved because only the sales 
price is relevant.168  In addition, arbitrage problems, which arise “when 
equivalent cash flows are packaged in different ways,” are eliminated by 
disaggregating all investments into returns to waiting and returns to 
risk.169 
Critics argue that there is an opportunity to manipulate the amount of 
taxes paid by using entity-shifting means,170 even though the avoidance 
cost under the current system is believed to be much larger.171  Schenk 
claims that the true issue with the proposal will come from its 
complexity, and the difficulty in understanding the calculations and 
elections that will be required.172 Taxpayers are likely to be confused 
“by the possibility of being taxed on a hypothetical gain recognition date 
that could occur even before the asset was acquired,” and further by the 
potential mismatch between the “gain” reported and the profit the 
investor would believe had occurred.173   
Under Land’s proposal, the tax due at realization would equal the 
pretax yield reduced by the tax rate.174 Land uses as an example a 
taxpayer, T, who invests $1,000 at a pretax interest rate of 10%. If not 
taxed, after 10 years the investment would grow to $2,718.175  Assuming 
a tax rate of 35%, the after-tax yield for a 10-year investment would be 
6.5%, or $1,916.  In other words, the government should receive $802 
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($2,718-$1,916). 176 Under the current system, however, the government 
collects $601 because the tax rate is applied on the nominal gain of 
$1,718, while the extra $201 is the tax deferral benefit.  The main 
benefit of Land’s method is that it resolves many of the valuation 
problems of the interest-on-tax proposals.177  Under Land’s retrospective 
method, the tax is not dependent on the holding period and thus the 
interest charged does not depend on the holding period.178  In addition, 
the timing of the appreciation is irrelevant, which solves the under/over 
taxation problems of the simplified accounting under the interest-on-tax 
proposals.179  Moreover, Land’s method taxes capital uniformly with no 
opportunity for substitution.180  The proposal also does not present any 
liquidity problems and resolves the lock-in problem and strategic 
trading.181 
Land argues that the taxpayer will have an incentive to get the 
valuation right because an accurate valuation is in the taxpayer’s best 
interest.182  Therefore, according to Land, the government can benefit 
from its reliance on the taxpayer’s calculations.183  Critics argue that this 
will be true only if tax and interest rates remain the same.184  If the rates 
change, reliance on taxpayers’ calculations will no longer be possible.185  
Moreover, even if rates do not change frequently, the valuation expense 
to the taxpayers will be significant.  Land argues that the calculations 
only appear complex, but in reality the proposal has the potential to 
eliminate much of the complexity that already exists under current 
law.186  Even so, Land acknowledges that simple models would not work 
well in complex situations, such as when an asset has multiple pay 
offs.187  Critics believe that valuations under Land’s approach will be 
more complex and required more often than under an accrual model.188  
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It is unclear whether the valuation expense under Land’s proposal is 
going to be lower than the cost under a mark-to-market system.189 
Land acknowledges that another problem with his method will be 
the way it treats losses.190  In situations where a single asset is disposed 
at a loss but the portfolio shows a gain, the investor will owe tax.191  
Finally, the main problem will still be the complexity of the proposal.  
Land’s method involves difficult formulas, the results will be sometimes 
counter-intuitive, and frequent valuations will be required.192  The cost 
to the taxpayer will be significant and individuals with  “any kind of 
investment (stick, home, IRA) would be subject to the rule.”193  This will 
discourage investments in capital income, which makesit likely that the 
administrative costs from adopting the proposal outweigh the increased 
revenue.194 
D. ANDREW’S PROPOSAL FOR REFORM 
William D. Andrews’ article, published in 1974, challenges the idea 
that the income tax burdens savings in an effective way.195  Andrews 
saw the problems with the realization requirement early, and called it the 
“Achilles heel” of the income tax system.196  Andrews believed that the 
rule made the tax law too uncertain and complex.197  He recognized that 
the rule needed to be fixed and believed that a consumption tax offered 
an easier and more just solution.198  According to Andrews, the 
consumption tax system allowed for a tax deferral on savings that 
resulted from realized income, while taxing the eventual consumption of 
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these savings at full, ordinary income rates.199  Andrews’ solution was a 
post-paid consumption tax system, which would resolve many of the 
inequities and inefficiencies related to the realization rule under the 
current income tax system.200  This section examines Andrews’ 
proposal, and addresses critics’ concerns. 
Under Andrews’ model, ordinary investments would be deducted in 
the same year they were invested and proceeds from their sale will be 
taxed if not reinvested at the same rate as ordinary income.201  This 
treatment will be very similar to the treatment under the current system 
and the realization rule.202  The difference will come from all ordinary 
income being taxed at the same time as realized capital gains, when 
consumed and not when earned.203  Andrews recognizes that the 
treatment of assets held for both investment purpose and personal 
enjoyment, such as artworks, jewelry, and personally occupied real 
estate, will require for a decision to be made as to whether a deduction 
will be allowed for such assets.204  For example, in an ideal consumption 
tax system, a valuable painting, which is purchased for investment 
purposes but is also hung on the wall for the owner’s enjoyment, should 
be taxed annually because the owner consumes the enjoyment of 
looking at the painting.205  At the same time, the painting was purchased 
for investment purpose as well as personal enjoyment and therefore its 
purchase price will be deducted from taxable income for the year.206 
Even more common would be the case with owner’s occupied 
residence.  If a family buys a second property for investment purposes 
but also uses that property for summer vacations, then that property 
would be a hybrid between an investment asset and property used for 
personal consumption.207  Andrews acknowledges that the decision of 
how to treat such assets would not be easy but he also points to the 
treatment of hybrid assets under a true-accretion type tax, which would 
necessitate the annual calculation of imputed income from the 
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enjoyment of such property.208  Andrews notes that the problem would 
exist only when hybrid assets are sold at a loss because if such assets 
were sold at a gain, the tax imposed on the gain would be “taxable in 
any event.”209 
III. GOING TO BACK TO BASICS: FIXING THE REALIZATION RULE WITH 
A CONSUMPTION TAX 
Andrews’ “most sophisticated argument” for a consumption tax 
system is the model’s pre-tax neutrality with respect to taxpayers’ 
preference for saving or spending.210  Andrews contends that the 
consumption tax does not discriminate between individuals whose 
present or future taste for certain goods and services is different than the 
preferences of other individuals.211  Andrews’ argument is one of 
horizontal equity, an argument that society in 1974 was not prepared to 
understand.212  Andrews’ consumption tax system eliminates all of the 
distortions caused by the realization rule under the current system and 
the valuation and liquidity concerns under a mark-to-market system.213  
Moreover, the added benefit of the system’s simplicity is another reason 
why a consumption tax system is the most efficient way to solve the 
realization rule problem.214 
Tax on consumption is source-neutral and thus it does not distort 
investment decisions.  In other words, because investments from all 
sources are taxed at the same rate and at the same time, tax 
consequences will not influence investors’ investment choices.215  In 
comparison, under the realization rule, tax is paid upon the triggering of 
a realization event, which occurs at different times for different 
investments, and thus, distorts investment decisions ex ante.216  In 
addition, a consumption tax solves distortions ex post, and the lock-in 
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effect of the realization rule is eliminated.217  That is because 
divestments are taxed only if consumed.218  If the proceeds are 
reinvested, there is no tax.219 
Furthermore, a consumption tax system solves many of the 
valuation problems under the current system.220  The treatment of 
unrealized capital gains under the current income tax system is partially 
justified because of the cost of appraisals under a mark-to-market 
system.221  A consumption tax eliminates this costly alternative because 
it does not require the appraisal of unrealized gains.222  In addition, a 
consumption tax eliminates the need for special tax rates for capital 
gains,223 which is sometimes justified with the lock-in effects of the 
realization rule.224  A consumption tax system treats unrealized gains 
and realized reinvested gains the same, and there is no need for 
preferential rates.225  Moreover, the valuation problem that results from 
the difficulty to separate risk-free return and market risk would 
disappear.226  Under a consumption tax model, no tax would be paid in 
uninflated dollars, as it would have been under mark-to-market system. 
Also, old costs would no longer be subtracted from current, inflated 
sales prices that currently result in miscalculations to profits.227 
Liquidity issues are also solved because tax is payable only when 
there is current consumption and the cash is available.228  Also, the 
hardship under the current system of recognizing and paying tax in one 
year on a gain accrued over many years is eliminated because only 
proceeds devoted to current consumption is taxed.229  Furthermore, the 
buy/borrow/die loophole230 is closed with a consumption tax system.231  
                                                                                                                 
 217. See Andrews, supra note 195, at 1153. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. See id. at 1152. 
 221. Evans, supra note 117, at 825. 
 222. See Andrews, supra note 195, at 1152. 
 223. Id. 
 224. See Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 65, at 320. 
 225. See Andrews, supra note 195, at 1152–53. 
 226. Id. at 1150. 
 227. Id. at 1153. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. at 1152–53. 
 230. McCaffery, supra note 16, at 893. 
 231. Id. 
512 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVIII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
 
Taxpayers can no longer borrow against their unrealized gains and wait 
to pass accumulated gains to their heirs at a step-up basis.232  Lastly, the 
administrative and compliance cost of a whole area of the law 
concerning the effect on individual investors in corporate 
reorganizations is obsolete with a consumption tax system.233  Because 
the exchange of securities is treated as a reinvestment, investors can take 
advantage of a deduction and no tax is due until divestment.234  
Similarly, no tax is imposed on compensation paid in stock or restricted 
property.235  Again, the tax awaits divestment and consumption. 
The current income tax system is not a perfect one, and is a hybrid 
of income and consumption tax.236  The hybrid aspect of the system 
leads to horizontal inequities because equal income from different 
sources is not taxed equally.237  The consumption tax system eliminates 
horizontal inequity because it taxes all consumption equally.238  A 
consumption tax system is fairer than an income tax system because 
people tend to consume at a steadier rate than they tend to earn.239  In 
addition, the problem of borrowing against unrealized gains, tax-free, to 
finance one’s lifestyle will disappear under a consumption tax.240 
Critics may also argue that horizontal equity would be 
compromised because certain investment assets have a dual investment 
and consumption purpose, and the consumption component remains 
untaxed.241  Andrews recognizes that certain assets cannot easily be 
classified as investments or consumer goods, such as jewelry, artwork, 
and owner-occupied houses.242  Andrews argues that this problem would 
also exist under a true accretion-type tax where the decision of whether 
to tax the imputed value from the enjoyment of such property will have 
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to be made;243 however, an accretion tax system would simply estimate 
and tax the market increase in value of the assets without regard for 
whether the owner has derived any enjoyment from owning the assets.244  
A better argument would be that tax on imputed consumption is similar 
to tax on imputed income,245 such as receiving free medical services 
from a family member.  Andrews explains that it would be acceptable to 
deduct the purchase of assets for imputed consumption as ordinary 
investments because this would be the equivalent of a failure to impute 
income under a true accretion-type tax.246  In addition, Andrews 
proposes an alternative where “a deduction would be allowed initially 
for large purchases, but the deducted amount would be returned to 
income over some specified period or at some specified rate.”247  In sum, 
while the treatment of unrealized gains for hybrid assets might be more 
complex than the treatment of unrealized gains for ordinary investments, 
horizontal equity is either not sufficiently impaired to outweigh the 
benefits of a consumption tax system, or if it is, then a possible solution 
exists. 
The main argument against the taxation of unrealized gains under a 
consumption tax model is that vertical equity is violated because the 
wealthy do not necessarily consume in the same proportion to their 
resources as do the poor.248  Critics argue that unrealized gains represent 
wealth, and the mere possession of wealth has benefits that raise one’s 
social status to a point where present consumption is not representative 
of one’s standard of living.249  Thus, opponents are concerned that one’s 
level of consumption cannot be the correct measure of equality.250 
In order to address this criticism, supporters of the consumption tax 
model, such as Edward J. McCaffery, separate the use of unrealized 
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gains that are not consumed into two categories: present use and 
potential use of unconsumed capital.251  In terms of present use, 
McCaffery addresses the possibility that unconsumed capital today 
represents power today.252  Wealth may also influence an individual’s 
behavior such as the ability to take risks or undertake entrepreneurial 
endeavors.  These examples are reminiscent of Rawls’ notion of equality 
of opportunity.253  Responses suggest that the tax system may not be the 
appropriate channel through which to ensure equality of opportunity and 
that government regulation might be more suitable to guarantee such 
rights.254 
Another possibility is that unconsumed capital today hides potential 
consumption tomorrow.255  Some responses against that view maintain 
that “[a] taxpayer cannot use ‘her’ capital without running through the 
gauntlet of the tax system.”256  In other words, a consumption tax will 
eventually get to a wealthy taxpayer’s unrealized gains even if it takes 
several generations to spend all of that taxpayer’s wealth.  That is 
because under a consumption tax system there will be no need to 
transfer wealth between generations on a step-up basis as only the 
consumption of that wealth would trigger taxation.257  Hence, even if a 
wealthy taxpayer chooses not to spend any of his wealth or only a small 
portion of it during his lifetime, under a consumption tax system, his 
heirs will eventually pay a tax on the consumption of their 
inheritance.258  In contrast, under the current tax model, that taxpayer’s 
wealth might never be taxed because as noted earlier, a wealthy taxpayer 
can simply borrow against his wealth and consume tax-free.259  Upon his 
death, the value of his shares will be transferred to his heirs on a step-up 
basis and the tax revenue of his unrealized gains will be lost forever.260  
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The most difficult problem to overcome under a consumption tax 
system would be its adoption.  The debate between an income tax 
system or consumption tax has remained largely academic.261  In the 
political arena, the benefits of a consumption tax have been largely lost 
in partisanship.262  With the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment in 
1913, the United States firmly committed to an income tax system 
motivated by the desire to get as much out of the yield to capital.263  At 
that time, a wide range of consumption tax alternatives were proposed 
but policymakers rejected all of them partly on the grounds that 
consumption tax represents a larger percentage of disposable income for 
the poor and middle class than it does for the wealthy.264  Andrews 
renewed the income versus consumption tax debate in 1974, making his 
famous argument that a consumption tax promotes horizontal equity 
between spenders and savers by not taxing the yield to capital.265  Alvin 
Warren responded to Andrews’ article by turning the question of 
fairness to vertical equity and looking at the outcomes ex post to 
evaluate the fairness of the tax.266  Warren argued that since, in the end, 
savers had more than spenders, it was appropriate to tax them more.267  
Warren’s argument resonated with the public opinion of the time.268 
Later, Andrews’ post-paid consumption tax proposal became a full-
scale legislative proposal when the Nunn-Domenici USA Tax made its 
way to the House floor in 1995.269  Congress rejected the proposal.270  
What the public and lawmakers had ignored then was how the 
realization rule affected vertical equity under an income tax.271  If 
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unrealized gains are never taxed even when consumed and if unrealized 
gains are the upper class’ main source of income, then the income tax 
system can hardly claim to preserve vertical equity.272  Andrews’ model, 
on the other hand, would tax the consumption of the wealthy regardless 
of whether that consumption was a result of realized gains or of a loan 
secured by unrealized appreciation.273 
Some of the public skepticism towards consumption tax stems from 
fear that rates will go up under a consumption tax system.274  Critics of 
consumption tax systems often assume that rates under a consumption 
tax have to increase to meet the demand for revenue.275  This assumption 
would not necessarily be true because, under a consistent post-paid 
consumption tax, the base will likely increase for two reasons.  First, 
because the realization rule will no longer create valuation problems, the 
preferential rate for capital gains can be repealed.276  Second, a 
consumption tax will capture consumption from debt in the base.277  
These two provisions will be able to compensate for the larger 
exemption of savings under a consumption tax. 
Others incorrectly believe that the adoption of a consumption tax 
will be a radical change;278 however, while the concept of a consumption 
tax system would be new to society, the actual implementation of the 
model would not present a huge change.  The reason is that we already 
have a system that is a hybrid between income and consumption.279  
Additionally, the actual implementation would only involve an 
unlimited deduction for savings and inclusion of debt as a taxable 
input,280 because of the Haig-Simons definition of income in which 
consumption equals income minus savings.281 
Recently, tax reform has received considerable attention from 
policy makers and is frequently discussed by companies and individual 
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taxpayers.282  The realization rule is cited as one of the system’s most 
serious problems that must be addressed through tax reform.283 All 
proposals that offer solutions to the realization rule problem under an 
income tax system create new complications.284  Because Andrews’ tax 
proposal solves the difficulties of the realization rule with minimal need 
for further adjustments to the system, it is timely and draws renewed 
interest. 
CONCLUSION 
Andrews’ proposal of a consumption tax system has often been 
cited for its ability to solve the realization rule problems in a simple and 
effective way.285  Indeed, Andrews’ approach emerges after a wave of 
other proposals because of its ability to remedy the equity and efficiency 
problems of the realization rule without creating a new set of 
difficulties.286  A consumption tax eliminates the lock-in effect of the 
realization rule, the valuation and liquidity concerns of the accretion 
system, preferential tax rates for capital gains, and inflation concerns.287  
The result is a simple tax on consumption from all sources, which 
promotes horizontal and vertical equity.288  Although political resistance 
may be a serious barrier to the adoption of a consumption tax, Andrews’ 
proposal remains a superior solution to the realization rule problem. 
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